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• 
GRAIN SALES OF RUSSIA--
THE SUMMER OF '72 REVISITE 'D 
R. J. CHAR KINS* 
ABSTRACT- A review of market conditions and price fluctuations since announcement in 1972 of 
large grain sales to Russia indicates that several major questions regarding the impact of those trans-
actions still unresolved. The functioning of international grain trade is delineated and possible effects 
on various segments of the United States and world economy are considered. 
The grain sales to the Soviet Union from the harvest of 
'72 still strikes fear in the hearts of some politicians, anger 
or resentment in the hearts of consumers and farmers, and 
expressions of wonderment at all the excitement by Agri-
culture department personnel. The purpose of this paper is 
to separate the wheat from the chaff; to discuss, in a system-
atic manner, the effects of the 1972 transaction on various 
groups. 
On the morning of July 8, 1972, President Nixon ann-
ounced the largest agricultural commercial transaction in 
recorded history . Following one of the worst crop years in 
a decade in the Soviet Union, the U.S. agreed to extend 
credit to the U.S.S.R. for Russian purchase of feed grains. 
Specifically, the Russians agreed to buy $ 750,000,000 
worth of feed grains over a three-year period and guarantee 
to take at least $200,000,000 worth in the first year from 
August 1, N72, to July, 31, 1973. The Commodities Credit 
Corporation (CCC) extended credit with the agreement that 
no more tan $500,000,000 worth of grain would be purchased 
on credit at any one time. During the crop year 1972-1973 
more than 430 million bushels of wheat ( one quarter of total 
U.S. production and 36 percent of total wheat exports) 
were purchased by the Russians at an average price of $1.63 
per bushel, totalling more than $700,000,000. 
Wheat and other related prices soared. Cries of corrup-
tion, bribery, mismanagement, and conflict of interest were 
heard. The result has been paranoia concerning exports of 
agricultural products, somewhat unlimiting restrictions on 
grain exports, and a new long-term agreement with Russia. 
Who was responsible? What was the problem? Who 
gained or lost? Was there criminal negligence, or was there 
willful and knowledgeable exp)oitation? 
This paper summarizes some questions left unanswered 
by congressional and justice department investigations. 
The groups to be studied are not mutually exclusive. 
They are 1) the American consumer, 2) the farmer, 3) the 
grain-exporters, 4) the Russian purchasers, 5) the recipients 
of wheat through the PL480 program, and 6) the American 
taxpayers. 
The Consumer. From l July, 1972 to 15 September, 
1972, the price of wheat delivered shipboard at U.S. ports 
jumped from an average of$ 1.69 per bushel to $2.38 per 
bushel. During the same period the food and fuel compo-
nent of the consumer price index remained relatively con-
stant, going from 124.2 to 124.9. By September of 1973, 
however, it was up to 136.6, the largest single yearly in-
crease since index records have been kept. More signifi-
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cantly, wholesale prices for farm products jumped from 125 
in 1972 to 176.3 in 1973. 
While there can be no doubt that food prices in general 
increased following summer of 1972, the cause and effect 
relationship is not quite so clear. When questioned about 
the effect of wheat exports on domestic prices, agricultural 
officals continously stated that there was little reason for 
the price of bread increase since there is a large and widen-
ing gap between the price farmers recieve for their wheat 
and the retail price of a loaf of bread. In fact, the wheat in-
put makes up only about seven or eight cents of a one 
pound loaf of bread. But it is not merely the price of a loaf 
of bread that is at stake. Because of a degree of substitut-
ability between hard wheat and feed grains, and because 
purchases of corn and other feed grains accompanied 
Russian purchases of wheat, the impact of the sale on beef 
and all beef and dairy products, pork and pork products, 
poultry, etc. must be measured. 
Two points need to be made concerning this price 
increase: 
1) The distributive effects are extremely important. In-
creases in the price of food are said to be regressive in that 
they hit hardest those who can least afford it. If this price 
increase were channeled to the farmers, and the subsidy 
program could then be eliminated, it would be a step to-
wards elimination of government intervention in the agri-
cultural sector, a move which should please the taxpayers. 
But that would exacerbate an already regressive tax struc-
ture through an indirect tax on the poor. 
2) Price increases as a result of free trade are a short-
run phonomenon which should be viewed in terms of the 
well-known long-run gains from trade through the law of 
comparative advantage. Unfortunately, short-run losses out-
weighed by long-run gains are not good politics. 
The U.S. Farmer. The major complaint by the 
farmers was not that U.S. exporters sold wheat to the 
Russians but that the wheat sold at unnecessarily low prices 
in view of the world market situation and that farmers 
suffered because they missed and opportunity for grain in 
1972. Wheat was sold early that year at an artifically low 
price due to bad advice from the United Staes Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), farmers claimed. 
Although serious grain shortfalls were evident in Russia 
and in several other countries and exporters had already 
sold to Russians more than half the total 1972 U. S. com-
mercial wheat exports, the Wheat Situation Report for 
August, 1972, stated: 
'World wheat trade in 1972/73 may rise moderately 
31 
above last season, mainly because of increased import 
requirements in Eastern Europe and Russia where 1972 
harvests have been reduced by poor weather. Stocks of 
the major exporters are down for a second straight year, 
but are still ample to meet anticipated needs.' 
The August 1972 Demand and Price Situation Report 
stated: 
'Prices may average around the year earlier level this 
season depending on the extent of export shipments to the 
U.S. S. R .... The outlook for 1972/73 was brightened by the 
recently announced 3 year. $750 million grain agreement with 
the U.S. S. R .......... With demand continuing firm, wheat 
prices received by farmers this season may average around 
the $1.31 per bushel of 1971/72.' 
Prices went well above the $1.31 forecast by USDA, and 
by the end of the year, the average price received by 
farmers was $2.38 per bushel. According to Weldon Barton, 
assistant legislative director for the National Farmer's Union 
however, farmers had sold the bulk of their crop by July 
at the $1.3 I price. His estimate of losses to farmers , entered 
into the Congressional Record, follows: 
Losses to Farmers 
Under the 1970 Agricutural Act, the 
farmer should receive 100 percent of parity 
on the production from his domestic allot-
ment. 
Under the law, payments to the farmer 
are actually made at the difference between 
the parity .price of wheat on July 1, and the 
average market price received by farmers 
during the five-month wheat marketing sea-
son: July-November. 
Parity price of wheat July 1, 1972: 3.02/ 
bushel. 













$1.70/bushel average for 5 months: 
$3.02 
-1.70 
l .32=payment /bushel 
If farmer sold wheat in July (i.e. after the 
July 8 announcement of sale to Soviet Union, 
but before prices began to rise August 4), and 
he received the average of $1.32/bushel: 
$ 1.32 payment 
+ 1.32 market 
2.64/bushel total rece ived by farmer 
SJ .02 parity on July I 
- 2.64 total received by farmer 
.38 loss/bushel 
If 400 million bushels sold, 45% of which was 
domestic alJotment : 
180 million bushels 
38 /bushel 
$68.40 million loss on wheat certificate 
payments 
In addition, on the other 220 bushels, the 
farmer would forgo the higher prices because 
he did not have the information that large 
shipments of wheat were involved--and 
therefore, that wheat was going up in price. 
Assuming that, if the farmer had been 
given the information to make judgments in 
the marketplace he could have sold this other 





220 million bushel s 
38 
$68.4 million loss on wheat certificate 
payment 
83.6 million loss in the market 
152.0 million total loss because market 
information was withheld from the 
farmer 
There are problems with that analysis, which merit 
investigation. 
Supply and demand analysis concludes that any increase 
in demand (given a normal product) will cause an increase in 
price . Thus, the "loss" implied by Barton on wheat certifi-
cates is a function of the higher price. If any wheat was sold 
at the higher price, a "gain" would have to be subtracted 
from the "loss". 
The implication of both GOA and Barton is that farmers 
sold an unusually large proportion of their crops early due 
to pessimistic price forecasts by USDA. In fact, as of 1 July , 
1972, farmers held more than 21 percent of the old crop 
on their farms and stilJ had 51 percent of the new crop on 
1 October. Both were record percentages. While there is 
no doubt that farmers would have received a higher price if 
they had been able to hold more of their crops until the 
price rose to the end-of-year high of $2.38 per bushel, other 
considerations such as storage costs and availability of stor-
age facilities must be taken into account. Two legitimate 
questions must be raised: 
Do farmers respond to price expectations by withholding 
or flooding the market? Indications are that their response 
has changed significantly since the summer of 1972. 
Did officials in the Department of Agriculture know-
ingly withhold information in order to hold prices down for 
the large grain exporting companies? Conflicting testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Government operations 
indicates that there was reason for Agriculture to have been 
aware that a sizeable grain deal was a strong possibility by 
July 3 , 1972. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz,and Assistant 
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Secretary Carroll Brunthaver claim that the first information 
they had on the wheat sales were on 19 September-- a point 
to be examined later. 
The Grain Exporters. Any discussion of the effect of 
the grain sales on the exporting companies must begin with 
an explanation of the now extinct grain exporting subsidy 
program. 
U. S. government involvement in the wheat market 
began in 1949. It took two forms : a price support program 
which allowed domestically sold wheat to vary from $1. 78 to 
$2.42 a bushel. Since these prices encouraged wheat pro-
duction in excess of domestic and international demand, the 
government offered a subsidy to wheat exporters-theY. would 
sell at some international price below the domestic govern-
ment supported price and American taxpayers would make 
up the difference. For example , if the prevailing U.S. price 
were $1.90 a bushel and the international price $1 .40, the 
government would pay the exporting companies 50 cents a 
bushel. Despite that effort to increase exports, government 
owned stocks of wheat continued to grow. In 1964, the dome-
stic support price was reduced to $ 1 .30 a bushel and has re-
mained at $1 .25 since 1965. The export subsidy was re-
tained despite the drop in the domestic support price to a 
level near the international price. 
From October , 1971 , to September 22, 1972, the target 
export price was $1.63 to $1.65 a bushel, based on competing 
Canadian prices adjusted for wheat quality and freight 
differentials. 
The subsidy program was administered by two government 
offices , the Export Marketing Service (EMS) and the Com-
modity Credit Corporation (CCC). The EMS established 
the amount of subsidy as the difference between the Kansas 
city daily wheat auction price and the $1.63-$1.65 target 
export price. Actual world prices were no longer considered 
after October , 1971. 
It is estimated that $333,000,000 was paid to those 
exporters responsible for sales to Russia. How much of 
that total was actually in keeping with the state purpose of 
making U. S. wheat competitive on the world market is a key 
question . 
In the late spring and early summer of 1972, the U.S. 
stood alone as a major supplier of wheat. Canada and 
Australia had both informed the Department of Agriculture 
that they would not be capable of any major wheat exports, 
and urged the U.S. to raise its export price above the $1.65 
level. The department did not, since the CCC held vast 
accumulated stores of wheat. There was concern also that 
any increase in price would encourage further production and 
retard demand. 
The registration date was another factor. Since the 
amount of the subsidy varied fro111 day to day, and rose as the 
domistic price rose, it was to the advantage of exporting 
companies to register for the s4bsides on the date when 
the subsidy was highest. This was facilitated by a system 
which allowed companies to register for a subsidy on any 
date regardless of whether they had bought or sold wheat. 
There was a penalty if a company didn't sell the amount for 
which it had registered within the market year September 
through August). It is estimated by the GAO that this 
ability to register for subsidy other than the date of sale 
cost an additional $1.7 million in subsidies on the 
Russi an wheat sales alone. This amounted to an average 
extra revenue of 29 .8 cents a bushel. Due to the benefits to 
he gained by choosing the right date to register, a type of 
speculative market in subsidy registrations developed . 
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Carry-charge increments were involved. Since Canada 
and Australia paid the carrying charges such as storage and 
insurance for companies which had pruchased wheat for later 
export, the Department of Agriculture agreed to pay 
American exporters a certain amount so that these charges 
would not be passed on to foreign customers. The problem 
was that exporters registered for storage at the same time 
as they registered for the subsidy. Thus, it was possible 
to receive payment for a supposed six-month period when 
the wheat had only been stored for two weeks. The 
purpose of the carrying charge increment was to make United 
States wheat competitive with Canadian and Australian 
wheat on the date of sale. fo mostcasesexamined by the GAO, 
the combined carrying charge increment plus sibsidy from 
registration was higher that the subsidy on the date of the 
sales con tract. 
The two price system's impact. The CCC was 
pleased to divest itself of unwanted inventory, and the 
Russian purchase provided that opportunity. In August, 
1972, CCC sold 158.5 million bushels of hard red winter 
wheat, more than half of it to those companies ex-
porting to the Russians. On August 31 the CCC sold 
wheat to two major exporters,68 million bushels to one and 
7 million bushels to another. The CCC price to the first was 
3 3/4 cents lower, and to the second 4 3/4 cents lower than 
the EMS price upon which the subsidy was paid. The first 
company gained a quick $2,400.000, the second gained 
$280,000 plus the additional subsidies collected on a price 
it had not paid. 
The difficulty of deciding how much of the subsidy 
actually was used for the intended purpose -- to equalize 
the high domestic purchase price with the lower export 
sales price -- stems from the impossibility of following 
a particular bushel of wheat from purchase to sale. 
What is clear, however, is that substantial extra revenue 
accured to the exporting companies from mere manipulation 
of purchase dates. The senate subcommittee investigations, 
as later reported , concluded: 
In this era of a seller's market for the 
American farmer, then there was no need in 
1972 for a wheat (export) subsidy to make 
American wheat more competitive in 
foreign markets ... Yet the subsidy on 
American wheat costing the American 
taxpayer more than 300 million dollars in 
1972, was continued ... The Subcommittee 
finds that the wheat subsidy was a waste 
of valuable Federal dollars and an il-
lustration of how Agriculture Department 
policy was inadequate, shortsighted and 
dictated by outmoded principals and 
philosophies ill-equiped for a changed 
world. 
Further windfall profits were possible for grain 
companies. Since the subsidy was based on closing Kansas 
City Board of Trade prices, manipulation there could have 
been extremely profitable. The Commodity Exchange 
Authority (CEA) , a branch of the Department of Ag-
riculture, investigated and found no evidence of manipulation 
but the Congressional Subcommittee investigated the in-
vestigator, Alex Caldwell, and charged in a 1974 report 
that, the CEA concentrated its investigation of specific 
trades on the wrong days. 
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It was further alleged that the grain companies were 
exceeding the speculative limits se.t by the CEA. a follow-up 
study by the subcommittee noted in July of 1974, 
'The record reflects that reports required 
by CEA from the grain companies contained 
incorrect information. Reports submitted 
by four of the six companies selling grain 
to the Russians understated sales com-
mitments. 5 
Prosectuion resulted in an agreement from one company 
to 'cease and desist' from filing erronous reports, an ad-
ministrative complaint by CEA against another, and a 
critical letter to a third. 
It is interesting to note that some administrators move 
back and forth from executive positions with large grain 
companies to high level positions with the Department of 
Agriculture and vice versa. But charges of conflict of in-
terest were found to be insubstantiated by the Justice De-
partment. 
The Russian Purchasers. To say that the Russians got 
a bargain is un understatement. The average price of 
their purchases of United States wheat was $1.63 per 
bushel for more than 430 million bushels, while the world 
price during the year after their purchases soared to $3.52 on 
the Rotterdam market and reached a peak of $6.26 in Jan-
uary of 1974. 
In terms of their actual pruchases from the grain 
companies, the Russians proved to be skilled exploiters of the 
system, purchasing bit by bit from company to company, to 
disguise the magnitude of the sale. Russians might well be 
eating cheaper bread now than Americans, subsidized by 
American taxpayers' dollars . 
A related question in what the Russians did with the 
wheat. It is not at all clear that all of it was consumed in the 
Soviet Union. It is alleged that the Soviet Union bought 
United States wheat low, watched the price rise, and then 
sold or gave away a far more valuable commodity to present 
and potential allies. Whether the grain exporters v.:ere acting 
in the interests of United States farmers or Russian buyers 
is not known. Representatives Neal Smith, of Iowa, claimed 
that the exporters were acting as buying agents for the 
Russians. The answer would depend to a great extent on 
the price at which the companies purchased wheat sold to 
the Soviets, and that information has not been made 
available. 
The Recipients of Wheat Through PL480. dwindling 
grain stocks, it is only normal that those who pay get 
wheat and those who don't, don't. In fact, Department of 
Agriculture said as much in March of this year: 
... the high prices caused the export value 
of Government programs to increase in fiscal 
1975 to the highest level since 1969, while 
the quantity exported in 1975 was about 
one-half the 1969 volume. 
'Wheat and products generally accounted 
for over half the total volume of Government-
program exports. Feed grains and products 
were the next largest quantity exported, 
followed by rice, vegtable oils, dairy pro-
ducts, and cotton. ' 
So the quantity of exports under PL 480 has declined, 
but recipients have had to pay more. Just as importantly, 
the percentage of total food aid that is payable with dollars 
or other hard currency has increased from 11 percent in 
1964 to 80 percent in 1974. This is obviously not a result 
of Russian purchases alone, but the effect of the Russian 
purchases cannot be neglected. 
The American Taxpayer. An estimate prepared by 
the Department of Agriculture concerning the effect of the 
Wheat Sales on the United States Treasury is presented 
here. The department emphasizes 'Net Savings to the U.S. 




Increased sales proceeds resulting from 50 
cents a bushel increase in CCC sales price 
on 367 million bushel inventory $184 
Annual reduction in storage and interest 
costs on 367 million bushels sold from CCC 
inventories 
Reauction in certificate payments to farmers 
becuase of higher prices: 
1972 program (535 million bushels at 38 
cents each) 
1973 program (535 million bushels at 20 
cents each) 
Reduction in additional set-aside payments 
under 1973 wheat program reflecting 
lower participation due to higher prices 
(7.2 million acres at $27 each) 
ADDED COSTS: 
Higher exprot payments reflecting increased 
quantity exported at higher payment rates. 
Shipping subisdy paid U. S. flag vessels 
Net savings to U.S. Treasury 
GAO note: These estimates were taken from 
documents prepared by Agri-
culture and are fro information 
only. GOA did not assess the validity 










Unfortunately, as stated in the note, the 'validity of 
the representations' was not assessed and cannot be with the 
limited information presented. The document is useful in 
pointing to some of the potential costs and savings to the 
taxpayers. Some of these are obvious: 
Any 'loss' to the farmer in the form of lower certificate 
payments must be a 'gain' to the taxpayer. 
Any wheat sold by the CCC that was being stored must 
decrease storage costs, so there must have been some saving 
to taxpayers, resulting from the sales to Russia the increased 
price of wheat did bring increased sales proceeds to the CCC. 
Reduction in set aside programs saved the Treasury money. 
The problem with this analysis, however, is the extent to 
which the impacts can be attributed to the Russian wheat 
deals. Agriculture can't have it both wa_ys. Either the wheat 
sales did have a major impact on the United States economy, 
causing wheat prices to rise, or they did not. The claimed 
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gains, would have to be backed by much more detailed 
analysis before they can be accepted fully. A further saving, 
not included, is the amount of grain not financed by the 
Treasury for the PL480 program. 
The additional costs, however, are a minimum figure. 
The higher export payments were extimated more than 
$300,000,000 by the Comptoller General's Office. The real 
question is not how much the taxpayer saved or lost under 
existing programs, but how much could have been saved if 
existing programs had been reviewed to determine their 
necessity. This theme crops up continually in the reports 
and hearings. 
The general thrust of this paper is not that U. S. grain 
should not have been sold to the Russians. Nor is is being 
argued that the short-run inflationary aspects of the sales 
were the major problem. Rather, this aspect has set up a 
smoke screen which might shield incompetent or crooked 
officials. The real question to be asked is who gained and 
who lost in the short-run and in the long-run. • 
The consumer's :loss, in the form of higher prices, was 
temporary. The overall increase in the consumer price index 
can be linked only tenously to the Russian wheat pruchases; 
it can be blamed as easily on overall commodity speculation. 
From a strictly economic standpoint, free trade of any 
kind brings long-run benefits. The major problem is the 
short-run distribution concern. 
The farmer's 'loss,' if if can be termed as such, was most 
probably a short-run, localized situation, ace.ruing mainly to 
those farmers whose crops came in early -- Texas, Oklahoma, 
Kansas, Illinois and Missouri. This, again, seems to be a 
distribution problem. The real question is whether 
officials in the Department of Agriculture know of the grain 
sales, knew that prices must rise, and purposely misled 
farmers. 
As to the grain exporters, whatever their gain, the 
questionable legitimacy is moet disturbing. Gains from 
exorbitant and unnecessary export subsidies seem clear. 
Further gains from manipulation of the closing price or 
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early futures pruchases(with knowledge of Russia's intended 
purchases) are less clear. 
The Russians got a bargain, but whether American 
wheat, sold cheaply to the Soviets, went at a dearer price to 
other destinations has not been verified. 
The large food donationsofthePL480program now seem a 
thing of the past, but in I 972, as least, they were linked to the 
Russian purchase. 
The American taxpayer, through events in the summer 
of 1972, said $300,000,000 in unnecessary subsidies. If this 
demonstrated that subsidies were no longer needed, it was an 
expensive lesson. If the Russian purchase helped raise the 
price of wheat and made domestic subsidies unnecessary, 
then it was nothing more than a transfer from the consumer 
to the taxp:-,yer. Not much more can be said. 
The 1972 grain transactions stand out not so much be-
cause of their effects on prices, taxes or subsidy programs,but 
because of the possibility of large scale wrongdoing that has 
never been fully or properly investigated. 
References 
Comptroller General of the United States, General Accout-
ing Office, Report to the Congress, "Russian Wheat Sales 
and Weaknesses in Agriculture's Management of the 
Wheat Export Subsidy Program", July 9, 1973. 
BARTON, WELDON V . Statement before the United States 
House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, 
Subcommittee on Livestock and Grains, "Sale of Wheat 
toRussia",Sept.14,18& 19, 1972 
U.S . Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations, "Russian Grain 
Transactions", July 29, 1974. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, March, 
1976 
35 
